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there is little empirical evidence on the potential benefits  fiscal decentralization on infant mortality are greater in
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Abstract:  While decentralization  offiscal  responsibilities is one of the main objectives that has emerged in
the agenda of national governments and international  organizations, there is little empirical evidence of
the potential benefits of this intervention.  This paper  is an attempt to fill, in part,  the void of quantitative
measurement.  Using panel  data on infant mortality rates, GDP per capita, and the share of public
expenditures managed by local governments, we find  that higher fiscal decentralization  is consistently
associated with lower mortality rates.  Our results suggest that benefits offiscal  decentralization are
particularly  important for poor  countries.  The results also suggest that the positive effects that fiscal
decentralization  has on infant mortality rates increase in institutional environments that promote political
rights.  Fiscal decentralization  also appears as a mechanism to improve health outcomes in environments
with high levels of corruption.  Finally, we  find  that environments with high levels of ethno-linguistic
fractionalization  tend to reduce the benefits from fiscal  decentralization.
1. Introduction
Decentralization,  in its various forms, has become a highly popular component  in policy reform.
Within the health sector,  decentralization  of finances and responsibilities  is one of the important
topics  that has emerged  in the  agenda of national  governments  and  international  organizations.
Indeed, devolving  some of the centralized responsibilities  to local levels  is expected to improve
both technical  efficiency  and allocative efficiency  (see Peabody et  al., 1999 for a review).  The
rationale  is that decentralized  programs can be designed with knowledge of the local culture  and
circumstances.  They can also be allocatively  efficient because  resources  can be devoted  to the
most-needed  local services.  With  decentralization,  fiscal  responsibilities  for  services  rest with
local managers who have incentives to improve efficiency given that they can use the savings for
other  local purposes.  Local  managers also  have more opportunities  to reduce costs.  They can
tailor staff and procedures to local resources and circumstances, rather  than relying on centrally
determined  procedures.  In  addition,  information  can be  used without  delay,  rather  than  after
permission is received from central agencies.  Another possible benefit of devolution,  at least in a
large  country,  is that  local  governments  can experiment  with  alternative  ways  of doing things.
Some of these ways may turn out to be superior and can then be adopted by other regions.
Despite  these  compelling  arguments  in  favor  of decentralization,  there  is  little  evidence  that
countries  which  have  decentralized  management  and  budgets  within their  health  systems  have
also  improved  health  outcomes.  Indeed,  studies  evaluating  the  impacts  of  decentralization  in
developing countries (see for example Visschedijk  et al., 1995; Green and Collins,  1994; Bossert,
1995; Bossert  et  al.,  1991; Gilson,  1993; Kutzin,  1994; and  Holland  and Pimphachanh,  1995)
provide  mixed  results.  Problems  associated  with  decentralization  include,  for  example,  an
increase  in regional  disparities  in the absence  of a  mechanism  to  transfer  resources  from rich
districts to poor districts.  Another  major problem  is associated with the lack of skilled personnel,3
the lack of information,  or the loss of economies  of scale which counteract efficiency  gains from
devolution.  In addition, decentralization may impose constraints to  the  implementation of
national policies and the creation of coordination  channels across regions (Guldner, 1995).  So
while qualitative studies have helped to understand the pros and cons of decentralization,  the
magnitude of its impacts on health outcomes remains  unquantified. This is unfortunate since in
the absence of such quantitative measurement, there is little that can be said in terms of the
economic costs and benefits from devolution. These are critical to inform the design of sound
public policies.
This paper is an attempt to fill, in part, the void of quantitative  measurements of the impact of
decentralization. Our focus is on the impacts offlscal decentralization  on an indicator of health
outcomes, the infant mortality rate.  To measure these effects we develop a simple theoretical
model that we then estimate on the basis of panel data for countries.  This panel includes an
indicator of fiscal decentralization  among the social and economic indicators derived from the
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2000).  The indicator has been computed as the
ratio  between total expenditures of local governments and  total expenditures of the central
government on the basis of the Government Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund,
2000). While the indicator is only a rough proxy for the fiscal decentralization  process, it allows
us to derive preliminary estimates of the magnitude of the potential correlation with the infant
mortality rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections.  Section 2 develops a theoretical
framework for estimation purposes.  Section 3 describes the data and econometric methods.
Section  4 summarizes  the results. Finally, Section 5 presents concluding remarks.
2. A theoretical  framework
As previously discussed, the major channel through which fiscal decentralization is likely to
affect health  outcomes is an  increase in  levels of allocative and  technical efficiency.  A
decentralized system  is  expected to  be  more successful in  allocating  scarce resources to
alternative interventions in  order to  maximize health outcomes.  To formalize this  idea, we
consider the problem faced by a benevolent  policymaker who attempts to maximize the national
average of a health outcome indicator such as the infant mortality rate.  The assumption of a4
benevolent  policymaker  does not necessarily  reflect reality, but it allows us to define a best-case
scenario to be used as reference in our empirical analysis.
We postulate  that  within each region  g in a country, the  outcome  indicator  M is a function  of
structural  characteristics  of the  economy  (e.g.,  the  level  of aggregate  output  and  its  regional
distribution),  call  them  0,  and  the  allocation  of  public  expenditures  xg,  among  a  set  of
interventions I (say female education, vaccination  campaigns, and so on).  We write:
Mg =fg(0,xgl,...,Xgj),  (1)
We assume that f(.) is a continuous  function which verifies  afg  > 0  and  '  <0, so that an
gi  g
increase in expenditures in any of the interventions increases the health outcome indicator, but the
marginal effect  decreases with the  level of expenditure.  Then the problem  solved by the policy
maker can be written as:
Max9, :M  M  ng2fg(o  xgl ...  *  x1  (2)
where  ng  is the contribution  of region g to the national average and Y is the total budget  to be
allocated'.  Optimality  implies  %  ng = i,  Vi  E I.  The interpretation  is that expenditures  need
axgj
to be allocated  in such a way that the marginal  impact of an additional  dollar to an intervention
i in region g (adjusted by its weight  ng), is the same across all interventions  and regions.  Hence,
in theory,  it is possible to compute the optimal level xg;  of spending  in intervention i in region g.
We would have,  x;,  = xgi  (0, Y)  or  sgj =  s(0),  where  s;  is the optimal  share  of expenditure  in
intervention i in region g.
Unfortunately,  in reality,  various  factors  deviate  expenditures  from their  optimal  levels.  First,
policy  makers  at  the  central  level  may  have  scant  information  about  the  functions  fg (.).
' We take this budget as given. The problem  of allocating  the entire public  budget or the problem  of
finding  the optimal  taxation rate is outside  the scope  of this paper.5
Another  possibility is simply that policy makers are not benevolent and have objective functions
that respond to political incentives rather than social welfare.  In these cases, the functions  used to
allocate expenditures will be different  fromfg (.)  and therefore observed  expenditures  Xg,bs  will
be sub-optimal.  By extension, the budget allocations to each region g defined by yohS  =  X 0bs
will be sub-optimal as well.
It  is  straightforward  to  show  that  for  a  given  region  g,  xg; = Xgj (0, Y)  are  also  solutions  to  the
problem:
Max;,:  Mg =  fg(0,Xgi-  xg,...,xgi)J-'xg;  - i)  (3)
where  yg  is the optimal budget of region g.  Equation (3) gives the problem that would be solved
by  a local, benevolent  policy maker  in control of budget  yg.  We  notice  that the  allocation  of
resources  by local governments  will generate a national optimum only if the budget  allocated  to
each  local  government  was  optimal  in  the  first  place.  Nonetheless,  even  if  the  budgets
Yg  =  Xbs  are  sub-optimal,  their  management  by  local  government  can  improve  the  health
outcome  as long as local authorities  have  a better  knowledge of fg (.).  If the  budget going to
region g is sub-optimal,  the resulting  level of expenditures  in each intervention will be different
from the optimal  level; however,  the relative  level of expenditures  will be optimal.  We would
have:  obs=  E X'
yg  jx  .
When the budget is managed centrally, we can measure the level of inefficiency  in the allocation
A  obs
to each intervention  by: ug, =  Exg'  - xgb  . Notice that we have  E  Eugi  = 0.  Hence, we can
~x;i  yg bsgI
think of U = E  E  ug; as a general indicator  of inefficiency. Clearly, U will be a function of the
g  i
share S of the total budget ygs  that is managed (i.e., allocated) by local authorities. The partial
derivative of U with respect to S will depend on the relative levels of efficiency of the local and
central governments  in the management  of public expenditures. Hence, we can postulate:6
au~~~~~7
@sU  = C(c  - 1),  (4)
where c and I are indicators of the level of efficiency  in managing public resources of the central
and  local  government  respectively.  So, if  c>l (meaning  that  institutional  capacity  at  the  local
level is low relative to the  center), an increase  in the  share of public  expenditures  managed by
local governments will increase inefficiency and reduce health outcomes.2
Under this set of assumptions, our health outcome indicator can be written as:
M = f(O, xj(9, Y'))-  h(U(j))  = g(9, Y) - h(U(s)),  (5)
where  h is a continuous  and monotonic  function which  gives the loss in the outcome  indicator
resulting  from inefficiencies  in the allocation of public expenditures.  Equation  (5) implies that
the  loss  caused  by  a  marginal  deviation  from  the  optimal  level  of  expenditure  in  a  given
intervention is the same across regions and interventions.  This is a rather restrictive  assumption,
but it is nonetheless necessary given the lack of data at the regional level.
A first order expansion of (5) gives:
M=g(O)+(6  -900)  ag  -h(U(So))-(S-So)
F 5g  c9~~~~~~h  aU  1 ag  ah  X = g(O)-00  ag  -h(U(SO))+SO  a  e ]+  ag  -,Ud  5(6 aoo  au 0 ajso  ao  suo  ~ 9 C-)S'  (6)
=  ao +  a1 + a 2 S
Hence,  the  sign of  a2 provides  information  on  the relative  levels  of efficiency  of central  and
local planners in allocating resources.  Now, it is reasonable  to expect that a2 is itself a function
of the country level of development  and/or other structural factors such as the level of corruption
or political rights.  A simple formulation  of this hypothesis would be:
2 Notice that in our framework  we have not assumed that fiscal decentralization  implies that each region
manages  its own resources. The efficient allocation of resources  across regions requires redistribution  of
resources  across  regions.7
a2 =ao +Xb',  (7)
where X is a row vector of structural factors and b is a row vector of parameters to be estimated.
The next section describes the data and methods used to estimate models such as (6) to shed light
on the question of how fiscal decentralization could affect infant mortality rates.
3. Data and methods
We use a  panel  of  low- and  high-income  countries  covering  the  period  1970-1995.  For each
country, we observe over time the infant mortality rate, the real gross domestic product per capita
(adjusted  for  purchasing  power  parity  or  PPP),  an  indicator  of  fiscal  decentralization,  and
structural  indicators  related  to  institutional  capacity  such  as  civil  rights,  political  rights,  and
corruption.  The number of available  observations  varies between  519 and 664 depending  on the
model  estimated3. The  indicator  of  fiscal  decentralization  is  defined  as  the  ratio  between
expenditures  managed  by  local  governments  and  expenditures  managed  by  the  central
government.  The indicator was constructed  on the  basis of the Government  Financial  Statistics
published  by the IMF.  This indicator has also been used by Fisman and Gatti (1999) to evaluate
the  linkages between  corruption  and fiscal  decentralization,  and by Davoodi  and Zou  (1998) to
look at the relationship  between economic  growth and fiscal decentralization.  WhileFisman  and
Gatti  find that fiscal df centralization  is associated with lower  levels of corruption,  Davood and
Zou  find  no  correlation  between  fiscal  decentralization  and  economic  growth  in  developed
countries, and a negative correlation  in the case of developing countries.
On the basis of models  (6) and (7) we estimate equations of the form 4:
log IMRi, = a0 + a  log GDPj, + aO log S 1 , + log Si,  (Xb')  + v, + e;,  (8)
where  IMR  is the  infant mortality  rate  measured in deaths per  1,000 live births,  GDP  is Gross
Domestic  Product  (our  proxy  for  the  variable  0),  S  is the  percentage  of  total  expenditures
3 The panel is unbalanced in the sense that most of the countries have missing data for some of the
variables  in some of the years. The estimation  methods  are adjusted  accordingly.
4  Models of the infant mortality rate usually introduce as predictors indicators of female education (a
demand  factor) and control for policy interventions  such as immunization  coverage  (supply factors). In our
framework,  however,  these indicators  are endogenous  interventions,  which are related to the level of GDP
per capita and the level of fiscal decentralization.  Hence,  we do not include them in the regression.8
managed by the local government,  X is a vector of structural indicators, v; are country specific
shocks, and e is white noise.  Table 1 presents summary statistics for each of the variables
included in the analysis. The high variance of GDP per capita in the sample used for estimation
purposes facilitates  the generalization  of the results from the analysis  to countries with a GDP per
capita lower than USD 1,000.
Table  1
Mean  of Model  Variables
Variables  Observations  Mean  SD  Scale
Infant Mortality  766  21.6  26.61
GDP Per Capita  989  8,177  6,515
(PPP)
Share of Local  1,145  21.4  20.4
Expenditures  (%)
Ethno-linguistic  1,056  0.23  0.23  0-1
Fractionalization
Corruption  1,028  4.27  1.5  0-6
Political Rights  938  2.52  1.7  1-7
Source: This study
Given that the variance of vi  is not equal to zero5,  model (8) cannot be estimated by Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) method.  Fixed effects models and random effects models are usual
alternatives.  Nonetheless, we prefer the fixed effects model given that the assumption of
independence  between the exogenous variables and  v, required for the random effects model is
6 not met.
4.  Results
We have estimated six models that differ in the vector  X of structural variables. The results are
summarized  in Tables 2 and 3.
The first model includes only GDP per capita and the indicator of fiscal decentralization. It
shows that, other things being equal, countries  where local governments  manage a higher share of
public expenditures tend to have lower mortality rates.  This does not imply that countries that
5 Test:  Varvi  )=0; X 2=427.4; Prob>  X2  =0.0000
6 Test:  Cov(x,  Vi  )=0; X (3)=460.26;  Prob>  X' (3)=0.00009
decentralize  the  management  of public  resources  will automatically  improve  health  outcomes.
Without  institutional  capacity at the local level, decentralization  is unlikely to be successful.  In
our sample of countries,  it is very likely that the share of public  expenditures managed  by  local
governments  is correlated  with their  level  of institutional  capacity.  Hence,  from the  data,  we
cannot distinguish between local governments with low and high institutional  capacity, and assess
how  decentralization  affects  health  outcomes  in each case.  The results,  however,  support  the
view that  if local governments  are strengthened then  fiscal  decentralization  is likely to improve
health outcomes.  For instance, in a country with a GDP per capita of USD 2,000, a 10% increase
in the share of expenditures  managed  by local governments  would  reduce the mortality  rate by
3.6%.  The results also show that the marginal benefits of decentralization  diminish as GDP per
capita increases.  For instance,  in the case of a country with a GDP per capita of USD 5,000, the
reduction  in  the  infant  mortality  rate  would  be  marginally  lower,  at  3.3%.  One  plausible
explanation  for  this  result  is  that  problems  associated  with  centralized  systems  diminish  as
economic development  takes place.
Table 2
Estimates from Fixed Effect Models
(within estimator)
[  Obs  664  664  519  608  532  616
Groups  67  67  46  54  49  55
R-2-Within  0.80  0.80  0.84  0.82  0.83  0.82
R-2-  0.76  0.72  0.54  0.77  0.57  0.79
Between
R2-Overall  0.77  0.73  0.  3  0.79  0.51  0.78
Coeff.  SD  Coeff.  SD  Coeff.  SD  Coeff.  SD  Coeff.  SD  Coeff.  SD
LogGdpPPP  -0.810  0.053  -0.890  0.056  -0.921  0.060  -0.948  0.058  -0.870  0.057  -0.879  0.055
LogLocal  -0.545  0.138  -2.238  0.449  -1.802  0.542  -2.339  0.445  -2.036  0.528  -2.175  0.447
LogLocal*  0.056  0.017  0.412  0.092  0.415  0.103  0.436  0.091  0.393  0.106  0.420  0.091
LogGdpPPP  .
LogLocal*  -0.018  0.005  -0.017  0.005  -0.018  0.005  -0.017  0.005  -0.019  0.005
LogGdpPPP2  I.I_I_I
LogLocal*  -0.234  0.077  -0.060  0.056
LogCorruption  .
LogLocal*  -0.197  0.065  -0.106  0.051
LogPolRights  .
LogLocal* logA  0.046  0.026
vElf
Constant  9.935  0.430  10.518  0.450  10.629  0.513  11.077  0.472  10.155  0.490  10.473  0.446
Source:  This study.10
Table 3
Elasticity of the Infant Mortality Rate with Respect to the Share of Local Expenditures
GDP Per  Reduced  Non-Linear  Full  Corruption  Political  Ethno-
Capita  Rights  linguistic
Fraction-
alization
1000  -0.377  -1.164  -0.711  -1.197  -1.011  -1.082
1500  -0.367  -1.111  -0.656  -1.140  -0.960  -1.028
2000  -0.360  -1.074  -0.618  -1.101  -0.925  -0.991
2500  -0.355  -1.046  -0.589  -1.070  -0.898  -0.962
3000  -0.350  -1.023  -0.565  -1.046  -0.876  -0.939
3500  -0.346  -1.004  -0.545  -1.025  -0.858  -0.920
4000  -0.343  -0.988  -0.528  -1.008  -0.842  -0.903
4500  -0.340  -0.973  -0.514  -0.992  -0.828  -0.888
5000  -0.338  -0.960  -0.500  -0.978  -0.816  -0.876
5500  -0.336  -0.949  -0.488  -0.966  -0.805  -0.864
6000  -0.333  -0.938  -0.478  -0.955  -0.795  -0.853
6500  X  -0.331  -0.929  -0.468  -0.945  -0.786  -0.844
7000  1  -0.330  -0.920  -0.458  -0.935  -0.778  -0.835
Source:  This study.
In the second model, we add the square of the logarithm of GDP per capita to account for a non-
linear effect of the level of "economic development"  on the elasticity  of the infant mortality rate
with respect to the share of public expenditures managed by local governments.  The coefficient
is highly significant and suggests that benefits from fiscal decentralization  will be higher for high
income  and  low-income  countries  and  lower  for  middle-income  countries.  One  possible
interpretation  of this result is that, at low levels of economic  development,  institutional  capacity
in local governments  increases at a lower rate than in the central government,  but increases faster
for high levels of economic development.  Introducing the new variable has an important  impact
on the size of the effect of fiscal decentralization  on the infant mortality rate.  Indeed, in the new
model,  a  10% increase  in  the  share  of public  resources  managed  by  local  governments  in  a
country with a GDP per capita of USD 2,000 would reduce the infant mortality rate by  10% (as
opposed to 3.6%).
To evaluate the role of governance, the third  model adds Knack  and Keefer  (1995) indicators of
corruption  and political  rights to the vector X.  Again, the coefficients for the new variables  are
highly significant despite a changing sample size (given that the indicators are not available  for
all  countries).  The results  suggest  that  the  positive  effect  of fiscal  decentralization  on  infant
mortality rates  is higher  in institutional  environments  with strong political rights.  This does not11
come as a surprise. One possible explanation  is that when political rights are high, communities
can better influence policy-making at the  local  level, and thus  encourage an  allocation of
resources that better meets their needs.  The results also suggest that  fiscal decentralization
appears as a  mechanism to  improve health outcomes in  environments with  high levels of
corruption. The  negative effects  of  corruption - distorted government resource allocation
decisions, reduced economic efficiency, impaired legitimacy of public institutions, and skewed
income distribution in favor of the rich, have been widely reported. We speculate that fiscal
decentralization, by redistributing the responsibility of the management of resources among a
higher number of officials, reduces the marginal pay-off that each official derives from being
corrupt and hence reduces the total level of corruption.  This result does not hold, however, when
the indicator of political rights is dropped (see model 4).  This points to  the importance of
political rights to enable the anti-corruption capabilities  of fiscal decentralization. On the other
hand, the indicator of political rights remains significant when the indicator of corruption is
dropped (see Model 5).
The last model introduces an average indicator  of ethno-linguistic  fractionalization  (see Fedderke
and Klitgaard, 1998).  This indicator measures the probability that two individuals picked at
random in a given country belong to different ethnic groups. The results show that when  ethno-
linguistic fractionalization is high, fiscal decentralization  tends to be less effective in reducing
infant mortality rates, probably  as a result of coordination  failures.
5. Conclusions
This paper explores the linkages between fiscal decentralization and infant mortality rates. The
study is based on a panel of developed and developing countries using socioeconomic  indicators
such as infant mortality rate, GDP per capita, and the share of public expenditures managed by
local governments  which is used as a proxy for the level of fiscal decentralization.
Five major results follow from the analysis in the paper: i) higher fiscal decentralization is
consistently associated with lower mortality rates; ii) benefits from fiscal decentralization are
particularly important for poor countries; iii) the positive effects of fiscal decentralization on
infant mortality rates are enhanced in institutional environments with strong political rights; iv)
fiscal decentralization  appears as a mechanism  to improve health outcomes in environments with
high levels of corruption; v) environments with high levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization12
tend  to  reduce the  benefits  from fiscal  decentralization.  Nonetheless,  these  results  need  to be
interpreted  cautiously:  first,  given  measurement  problems  associated  with  aggregated  country
data;  and second, given that the indicator of fiscal decentralization used in the analysis is a very
crude proxy for the fiscal decentralization  process.
It  is also  important  to  stress  that  the  results  presented  in  this  paper  do  not  imply  that  fiscal
decentralization  is a magic recipe to improve health outcomes.  Appropriate institutional  capacity
at  the  local  level  should  be  an  important  pre-condition.  An  optimal  allocation  of  public
expenditures  across  regions  and  program  interventions  also  requires  appropriate  coordination
channels  between  regions  and  adequate transfer  mechanisms  (most  likely from  rich regions  to
poor  regions).  Public  expenditure  reviews  at  the  local  level  can  constitute  an  important
instrument to guide this process.  Other instruments include training in management  and financial
planning and the endowment of modern information technologies.
In short, successful decentralization  requires strong leadership from the central government.  The
central  government  must  be  able  to  influence  local  policy  and  implementation  without
compromising  the  autonomy  of local  decision-making  from  which  many  of the  benefits  of  a
devolved  system  would  be  expected to  flow.  As stated  by Guldner  "decentralization  without
direction appears to undermine  health system effectiveness".13
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